On the Evolutionary Emergence of Optimism
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Cited by:
- Konrad, Kai A. & Spadaro, Amedeo, 2006.
"Education, redistributive taxation and confidence,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 171-188, January.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Spadaro, Amedeo, 2005. "Education, Redistributive Taxation and Confidence," IZA Discussion Papers 1478, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Kai A. Konrad & Amadéo Spadaro, 2006. "Education, redistributive taxation and confidence," Post-Print halshs-00754180, HAL.
- Kai A. Konrad & Amadéo Spadaro, 2005. "Education, redistributive taxation and confidence," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590862, HAL.
- Kai A. Konrad & Amadéo Spadaro, 2005. "Education, redistributive taxation and confidence," Working Papers halshs-00590862, HAL.
- Konrad, Kai Andreas & Spadaro, Amedeo, 2005. "Education, redistributive taxation and confidence [Bildung, Steuerumverteilung und Vertrauen]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2005-05, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Nava Ashraf & Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, 2005. "Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 131-145, Summer.
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Keywords
dispositions; evolution of preferences; selection dynamics; perception biases; interdependent preferences; imperfect observability;All these keywords.
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