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The elementary economics of social dilemmas

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  • B. Curtis Eaton

Abstract

. A social dilemma is, in essence, a prisoners’ dilemma in a continuous strategy space. I discuss a number of social dilemmas that have caught my attention, offer an elementary, diagrammatic synthesis of them, and discuss some of the economic insights that the diagrams capture, including incentives for pre‐commitment. Finally, I model pre‐commitment via delegation and link results to the literature on the evolution of preferences. L’économie élémentaire des dilemmes sociaux. Un dilemme social est essentiellement un dilemme du prisonnier dans un espace continu de stratégie. L’auteur discute d’un certain nombre de dilemmes sociaux qui ont retenu son attention, il en propose une synthése graphique élémentaire, et discute certaines des suggestions économiques qui découlent de ces diagrammes, comme par exemple les incitations à se pré‐engager. Finalement, l’auteur construit un modèle de pré‐engagement par délégation et relie ses résultats à la littérature sur l’évolution des références.

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  • B. Curtis Eaton, 2004. "The elementary economics of social dilemmas," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(4), pages 805-829, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:37:y:2004:i:4:p:805-829
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.00249.x
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