IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nwu/cmsems/1109.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

e-Consistent Equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • Ehud Lehrer
  • Sylvain Sorin

Abstract

We deal with the concept of e-consistent equilibrium which corresponds to strategies inducing an e-equilbrium in any subgame reached along the play path. Examples and existence conditions are given.

Suggested Citation

  • Ehud Lehrer & Sylvain Sorin, 1994. "e-Consistent Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 1109, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1109
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1109.pdf
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-1045, September.
    2. Sergiu Hart, 1985. "Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(1), pages 117-153, February.
    3. repec:cor:louvrp:-636 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Mertens,Jean-François & Sorin,Sylvain & Zamir,Shmuel, 2015. "Repeated Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107030206.
      • Mertens,Jean-François & Sorin,Sylvain & Zamir,Shmuel, 2015. "Repeated Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107662636.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Vieille, Nicolas, 2002. "Stochastic games: Recent results," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 48, pages 1833-1850, Elsevier.
    2. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1770-1795, September.
    3. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-1045, September.
    4. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
      • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
    5. Lehrer, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Rann, 1997. "Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 116-134, January.
    6. Martin W. Cripps & Jonathan P. Thomas, 2003. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(3), pages 433-462, August.
    7. Sorin, Sylvain, 1999. "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 274-308, October.
    8. Sylvain Chassang, 2010. "Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 448-465, March.
    9. Schipper, Burkhard C., 2021. "Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    10. Tom Johnston & Michael Savery & Alex Scott & Bassel Tarbush, 2023. "Game Connectivity and Adaptive Dynamics," Papers 2309.10609, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    11. David Baron & Ehud Kalai, 1990. "Dividing a Cake by Majority: The Simplest Equilibria," Discussion Papers 919, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    12. Anthonisen, Niels, 1997. "On the Convergence of Beliefs within Populations in Games with Learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 169-184, September.
    13. S. S. Askar & A. Al-khedhairi, 2019. "Analysis of a Four-Firm Competition Based on a Generalized Bounded Rationality and Different Mechanisms," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2019, pages 1-12, May.
    14. Philippe Jehiel, 2022. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium and Related Concepts:Theory, Applications, and Beyond," Working Papers halshs-03735680, HAL.
    15. Hopkins, Ed, 1999. "Learning, Matching, and Aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 79-110, January.
    16. Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 232-274.
    17. Jehiel, Philippe, 1998. "Learning to Play Limited Forecast Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 274-298, February.
    18. Colin, Stewart, 2011. "Nonmanipulable Bayesian testing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2029-2041, September.
    19. Bergin, James, 1989. "A characterization of sequential equilibrium strategies in infinitely repeated incomplete information games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 51-65, February.
    20. Thomas Norman, 2012. "Almost-Rational Learning of Nash Equilibrium without Absolute Continuity," Economics Series Working Papers 602, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1109. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Fran Walker (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cmnwuus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.