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Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information

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  • Lehrer, Ehud
  • Smorodinsky, Rann

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  • Lehrer, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Rann, 1997. "Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 116-134, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:116-134
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-1045, September.
    2. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1994. "Weak and strong merging of opinions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 73-86, January.
    3. Koutsougeras, Leonidas C & Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1994. "Convergence and Approximation Results for Non-cooperative Bayesian Games: Learning Theorems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(6), pages 843-857, October.
    4. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1231-1240, September.
    5. Ehud Lehrer & Rann Smorodinsky, 1996. "Compatible Measures and Merging," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 21(3), pages 697-706, August.
    6. Sergiu Hart, 1985. "Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(1), pages 117-153, February.
    7. Nyarko, Yaw, 1994. "Bayesian Learning Leads to Correlated Equilibria in Normal Form Games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(6), pages 821-841, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai & Rann Smorodinsky, 1997. "Patterns, Types, and Bayesian Learning," Game Theory and Information 9711002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Merging Economic Forecasts," Discussion Papers 1035, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Levy, Yehuda John, 2015. "Limits to rational learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 1-23.
    4. Jackson, Matthew O. & Kalai, Ehud, 1997. "Social Learning in Recurring Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 102-134, October.
    5. Epstein Larry G & Noor Jawwad & Sandroni Alvaro, 2010. "Non-Bayesian Learning," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-20, January.
    6. Dean Foster & H Peyton Young, 1999. "On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents," Economics Working Paper Archive 423, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jun 2001.
    7. Erel Avineri & Joseph Prashker, 2006. "The Impact of Travel Time Information on Travelers’ Learning under Uncertainty," Transportation, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 393-408, July.
    8. Sorin, Sylvain, 1999. "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 274-308, October.
    9. Matthew Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1995. "Recurring Bullies," Discussion Papers 1151, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1997. "False Reputation in a Society of Players," Discussion Papers 1184R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    11. Nyarko, Y., 1998. "The Truth is in the Eye of the Beholder: or Equilibrium in Beliefs and Rational Learning in Games," Working Papers 98-12, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    12. Alvaro Sandroni, 1997. "Learning Rare Events," Discussion Papers 1199, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    13. Lehrer, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2000. "Relative entropy in sequential decision problems1," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 425-439, May.
    14. Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai & Rann Smorodinsky, 1999. "Bayesian Representation of Stochastic Processes under Learning: de Finetti Revisited," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 875-894, July.
    15. Alvaro Sandroni, 1997. "The Speed of Rational Learning," Discussion Papers 1192, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    16. Sandroni, Alvaro, 1998. "Learning, Rare Events, and Recurrent Market Crashes in Frictionless Economies without Intrinsic Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 1-18, September.
    17. Sandroni, Alvaro, 1998. "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergence to Nash Equilibrium: The Almost Absolute Continuity Hypothesis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 121-147, January.
    18. Alvaro Sandroni, "undated". ""Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergence to Nash Equilibrium: The Almost Absolute Continuity Hypothesis''," CARESS Working Papres 95-08, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
    19. Jackson, Matthew O. & Kalai, Ehud, 1999. "Reputation versus Social Learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 40-59, September.

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