Intergovernmental fiscal transfers as pork barrel
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9863-2
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- Linda Gonçalves Veiga & Francisco José Veiga, 2010. "Intergovernmental fiscal transfers as pork barrel," NIPE Working Papers 7/2010, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
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More about this item
Keywords
Intergovernmental transfers; Electoral competition; Pork-barrel politics; H77; D72; D78; E62;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
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