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IMF arrangements, politics and the timing of stabilizations

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Abstract

This paper analyses the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) arrangements on the timing of inflation stabilization programs. Essentially, we test the hypothesis that IMF aid accelerates stabilization using probit and proportional hazards models. As in theoretical models, results are mixed: larger withdrawals of the amounts agreed to seem to hasten stabilization, but there is weak evidence that IMF arrangements lead to greater delays. Concerning other effects, greater fragmentation of the political system delays stabilization while higher inflation tends to hasten it. Other political and economic variables do not seem to have significant effects on the timing of stabilizations.

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  • Francisco José Veiga, 2002. "IMF arrangements, politics and the timing of stabilizations," NIPE Working Papers 2/2002, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    • Handle: RePEc:nip:nipewp:2/2002
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    2. Francisco José Veiga, 2000. "Delays of Inflation Stabilizations," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 275-295, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dreher, Axel & Walter, Stefanie, 2010. "Does the IMF Help or Hurt? The Effect of IMF Programs on the Likelihood and Outcome of Currency Crises," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-18, January.
    2. Dreher, Axel, 2006. "IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 769-788, May.

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    IMF; stabilization; timing; politics.;
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