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A Multi-Agent Congestion and Pricing Model

Author

Listed:
  • Xi Zou
  • David Levinson

    (Nexus (Networks, Economics, and Urban Systems) Research Group, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Minnesota)

Abstract

A multi-agent model of travelers competing to utilize a roadway in time and space is presented in this paper to illustrate the effect of congestion and pricing on traveler behaviors and network equilibrium. To realize the spillover effect among travelers, N-player games are constructed in which the strategy set include (N+1) strategies. We solve the discrete N-player game (for N less than 8) and find Nash equilibria if they exist. This model is compared to the bottleneck model. The results of numerical simulation show that the two models yield identical results in terms of lowest total costs and marginal costs when a social optimum exists.

Suggested Citation

  • Xi Zou & David Levinson, 2006. "A Multi-Agent Congestion and Pricing Model," Working Papers 200605, University of Minnesota: Nexus Research Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:nex:wpaper:multiagentcongestionmodel
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11299/179933
    File Function: First version, 2007
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Levinson, David, 2005. "Micro-foundations of congestion and pricing: A game theory perspective," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 39(7-9), pages 691-704.
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    Cited by:

    1. Janusch, Nicholas, 2016. "A note on the distortionary effects of revenue-neutral tolls in a bottleneck congestion game," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 95-103.
    2. Shanjiang Zhu & David Levinson & Lei Zhang, 2007. "An Agent-based Route Choice Model," Working Papers 000089, University of Minnesota: Nexus Research Group.
    3. Xiao, Feng & Shen, Wei & Michael Zhang, H., 2012. "The morning commute under flat toll and tactical waiting," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 46(10), pages 1346-1359.
    4. Hugo E. Silva & Robin Lindsey & André de Palma & Vincent A. C. van den Berg, 2017. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in the Bottleneck Model with Atomic Users," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 863-881, August.
    5. Sutee Anantsuksomsri & Nij Tontisirin, 2016. "A spatial agent-based model of a congestion game: evolutionary game theory in space," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 57(2), pages 371-391, November.
    6. Otsubo, Hironori & Rapoport, Amnon, 2008. "Vickrey's model of traffic congestion discretized," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 42(10), pages 873-889, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agent-based Model; Game Theory; Congestion; Queueing; Traffic Flow; Congestion Pricing; Road Pricing; Value Pricing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise
    • R42 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government and Private Investment Analysis; Road Maintenance; Transportation Planning
    • R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy
    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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