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Mentoring and Diversity

Author

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  • Susan Athey
  • Christopher Avery
  • Peter Zemsky

Abstract

This paper studies the forces which determine how diversity at a firm evolves over time. We consider a dynamic model o a single firm with two levels of employees, the entry level and the upper level. In each period, the firm selects a subset of the entry-level workers for promotion to the upper level. The members of the entry-level worker pool vary in their initial ability as well as in their type,' where type could refer to gender or cultural background. Employees augment their initial ability by acquiring specific human capital in mentoring interactions with upper level employees. We assume that an entry-level worker receives more mentoring when a greater proportion of upper-level workers match the entry-level worker's type. In this model, it is optimal for the firm to consider type in addition to ability in making promotion decisions, so as to maximize the effectiveness of future mentoring. We derived conditions under which firms attain full diversity, as well as conditions under which there are multiple steady states, so that the level of diversity depends on the firm's initial conditions. With multiple steady states, temporary affirmative action policies can have a long-run impact on diversity levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Susan Athey & Christopher Avery & Peter Zemsky, 1998. "Mentoring and Diversity," NBER Working Papers 6496, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6496
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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