IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/27353.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Corporate Culture as a Theory of the Firm

Author

Listed:
  • Gary B. Gorton
  • Alexander K. Zentefis

Abstract

Markets and firms offer contrasting methods to arrange production. In markets, contracts govern the purchase of parts and services that compose production. In firms, the shared values, customs, and norms coming from a corporate culture govern employees’ joint development of those parts and services. We argue for this distinction as a theory of the firm. Firms exist because corporate culture at times is more efficient at carrying out production than detailed contracts. The firm’s boundary encircles the parts of production for which a manager optimally chooses corporate culture as the organizing device. The model can explain why some mergers and acquisitions fail, in a way consistent with empirical evidence, and why corporate cultures are hard to change.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary B. Gorton & Alexander K. Zentefis, 2020. "Corporate Culture as a Theory of the Firm," NBER Working Papers 27353, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27353
    Note: CF IO
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w27353.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Laura Alfaro & Nick Bloom & Paola Conconi & Harald Fadinger & Patrick Legros & Andrew F Newman & Raffaella Sadun & John Van Reenen, 2024. "Come Together: Firm Boundaries and Delegation," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 22(1), pages 34-72.
    2. Editors The, 2008. "From the Editors," Basic Income Studies, De Gruyter, vol. 2(2), pages 1-3, January.
    3. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-817, August.
    4. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    5. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    6. -, 1986. "Agenda = Agenda," Series Históricas 8749, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    7. George G. Gordon & Nancy DiTomaso, 1992. "Predicting Corporate Performance From Organizational Culture," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(6), pages 783-798, November.
    8. Gary B. Gorton & Alexander K. Zentefis, 2019. "Social Progress and Corporate Culture," NBER Working Papers 25484, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Editors The, 2008. "From the Editors," Basic Income Studies, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-1, July.
    10. Günter K. Stahl & Andreas Voigt, 2008. "Do Cultural Differences Matter in Mergers and Acquisitions? A Tentative Model and Examination," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(1), pages 160-176, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Olena F. Androsova & Natalia V. Katkova, 2022. "Diagnostics of Corporate Culture on Machine-Building Enterprises in Ukraine," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 3, pages 149-161.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gary B. Gorton & Alexander K. Zentefis, 2024. "Corporate culture as a theory of the firm," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 91(364), pages 1391-1423, October.
    2. Ozdenoren, Emre & Rubanov, Oleg, 2022. "Profit Sharing and Incentives," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    3. Yeon-Koo Che & Seung-Weon Yoo, 2001. "Optimal Incentives for Teams," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 525-541, June.
    4. Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2008. "Relative Performance Evaluation, Agent Hold-up and Firm Organization," NBER Chapters, in: Organizational Innovation and Firm Performance, pages 229-241, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Minkler, Lanse, 2004. "Shirking and motivations in firms: survey evidence on worker attitudes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 863-884, June.
    6. Bardhan, Pranab & Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert, 2000. "Wealth inequality, wealth constraints and economic performance," Handbook of Income Distribution, in: A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon (ed.), Handbook of Income Distribution, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 10, pages 541-603, Elsevier.
    7. Gui, Emi Minghui & Diesendorf, Mark & MacGill, Iain, 2017. "Distributed energy infrastructure paradigm: Community microgrids in a new institutional economics context," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 1355-1365.
    8. You, Xialei & Jia, Shenghua & Dou, Junsheng & Su, Emma, 2020. "Is organizational slack honey or poison? Experimental research based on external investors' perception," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
    9. Hertel, Tobias & Kaya, Devrimi & Reichmann, Doron, 2024. "Corporate culture and M&A deals: Using text from crowdsourced employer reviews to measure cultural differences," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    10. James Jr., Harvey S., 2002. "The trust paradox: a survey of economic inquiries into the nature of trust and trustworthiness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 291-307, March.
    11. Rosalie L Tung & Günter K Stahl, 2018. "The tortuous evolution of the role of culture in IB research: What we know, what we don’t know, and where we are headed," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 49(9), pages 1167-1189, December.
    12. Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta, 2010. "Editors’ Introduction," Chapters, in: Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. Laurent, Catherine E. & Berriet-Solliec, Marielle & Kirsch, Marc & Labarthe, Pierre & Trouve, Aurelie, 2010. "Multifunctionality Of Agriculture, Public Policies And Scientific Evidences: Some Critical Issues Of Contemporary Controversies," APSTRACT: Applied Studies in Agribusiness and Commerce, AGRIMBA, vol. 4(01-2), pages 1-6.
    14. Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert, 2006. "Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity," IZA Discussion Papers 2106, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    15. Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2006. "Team Incentives in Relational Employment Contracts," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 139-170, January.
    16. Kim, Jongwook & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2008. "A Strategic Theory of the Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Contracts: A Property Rights Approach," Working Papers 08-0108, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    17. Kim, Sukkoo, 1999. "The Rise of Multiunit Firms in U.S. Manufacturing," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 360-386, October.
    18. Matthias Kiefer & Edward Jones & Andrew Adams, 2016. "Principals, Agents and Incomplete Contracts: Are Surrender of Control and Renegotiation the Solution?," CFI Discussion Papers 1603, Centre for Finance and Investment, Heriot Watt University.
    19. Andrew F. Newman, 1991. "The Capital Market," Discussion Papers 951, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    20. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "The Governance of the New Enterprise," CRSP working papers 487, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27353. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.