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Target setting and Allocative Inefficiency in Lending: Evidence from Two Chinese Banks

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  • Yiming Cao
  • Raymond Fisman
  • Hui Lin
  • Yongxiang Wang

Abstract

We study the consequences of month-end lending incentives for Chinese bank managers. Using data from two banks, one state-owned and the other partially privatized, we show a clear increase in lending in the final days of each month, a result of both more loan issuance and higher value per loan. We estimate that daily end-of-month lending is 95 percent higher in the last 5 days of each month as a result of loan targets, with only a small amount plausibly attributable to shifting loans forward from the following month. End-of-month loans are 2.1 percentage points (more than 16 percent) more likely to be classified as bad in the years following issuance; a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the incremental loans made in order to hit targets are 26 percent more likely to eventually turn bad. Our work highlights the distortionary effects of target-setting on capital allocation, in a context in which such concerns have risen to particular prominence in recent years.

Suggested Citation

  • Yiming Cao & Raymond Fisman & Hui Lin & Yongxiang Wang, 2018. "Target setting and Allocative Inefficiency in Lending: Evidence from Two Chinese Banks," NBER Working Papers 24961, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24961
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    Cited by:

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    3. Yi Huang & Marco Pagano & Ugo Panizza, 2020. "Local Crowding‐Out in China," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(6), pages 2855-2898, December.
    4. Gu, Leilei & Peng, Yuchao & Vigne, Samuel A. & Wang, Yizhi, 2023. "Hidden costs of non-green performance? The impact of air pollution awareness on loan rates for Chinese firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 213(C), pages 233-250.
    5. Fan, Haichao & Peng, Yuchao & Wang, Huanhuan & Xu, Zhiwei, 2021. "Greening through finance?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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