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Inconsistent Policy Evaluation: A Case Study for a Large Workfare Program

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  • Arthur Alik-Lagrange
  • Martin Ravallion

Abstract

Evaluations of workfare programs in poor rural economies have typically ignored two features that policy makers stress: involuntary unemployment and the expected welfare losses from work requirements. The paper generalizes past evaluation theory and methods to incorporate both features, and shows that doing so can switch the policy ranking in favor of welfare over workfare. A case study for India’s massive National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme indicates lower impacts on poverty than suggested by past methods, despite a more “poor-poor” incidence. A basic-income guarantee would dominate net workfare earnings in terms of the impact on poverty for a given budgetary outlay.

Suggested Citation

  • Arthur Alik-Lagrange & Martin Ravallion, 2015. "Inconsistent Policy Evaluation: A Case Study for a Large Workfare Program," NBER Working Papers 21041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21041
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    Cited by:

    1. Jules Gazeaud & Victor Stephane, 2023. "Productive Workfare? Evidence from Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Program," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 105(1), pages 265-290, January.
    2. Gehrke, Esther & Hartwig, Renate, 2015. "How can public works programmes create sustainable employment?," IDOS Discussion Papers 11/2015, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).
    3. Deininger,Klaus W. & Nagarajan,Hari Krishnan & Singh,Sudhir K. & Deininger,Klaus W. & Nagarajan,Hari Krishnan & Singh,Sudhir K., 2016. "Short-term effects of India's employment guarantee program on labor markets and agricultural productivity," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7665, The World Bank.
    4. Manisha Shah & Bryce Millett Steinberg, 2021. "Workfare and Human Capital Investment: Evidence from India," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 56(2), pages 380-405.
    5. Sheahan, Megan & Liu, Yanyan & Narayanan, Sudha & Barrett, Christopher B., 2015. "Disaggregated labor supply implications of guaranteed employment in India," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 237345, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    6. Deininger, Klaus & Liu, Yanyan, 2019. "Heterogeneous welfare impacts of National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme: Evidence from Andhra Pradesh, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 98-111.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • H43 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • J08 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics Policies
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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