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On the Negative Correlation Between Performance and Experience and Education

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  • Andrew Weiss
  • Henry Landau

Abstract

We consider a model where a worker's productivity must exceed some lower bound for himto satisfy the minimum qualifications for a particular job. If the worker's productivity exceeds some upper bound he is promoted. We assume the productivity of every worker increases with experience, tenure and education. This relationship differs across workers. We present distributions of workers with the property that, among workers on a particular job, education, experience, or tenure is negatively correlated with productivity; even though for any single worker on that job those demographic characteristics have strongly positive effects on productivity. The result is due to the effect of the job assignment rule on the distribution of workers on the job.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Weiss & Henry Landau, 1985. "On the Negative Correlation Between Performance and Experience and Education," NBER Working Papers 1613, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1613
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James L. Medoff & Katharine G. Abraham, 1981. "Are Those Paid More Really More Productive? The Case of Experience," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 16(2), pages 186-216.
    2. J. Luis Guasch & Andrew Weiss, 1982. "An Equilibrium Analysis of Wage—Productivity Gaps," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(4), pages 485-497.
    3. James L. Medoff & Katharine G. Abraham, 1980. "Experience, Performance, and Earnings," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 95(4), pages 703-736.
    4. Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-1284, December.
    5. Jacob A. Mincer, 1974. "Schooling and Earnings," NBER Chapters, in: Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, pages 41-63, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Lazear, Edward P, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 606-620, September.
    7. Smith Freeman, 1977. "Wage Trends as Performance Displays Productive Potential: A Model and Application to Academic Early Retirement," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 419-443, Autumn.
    8. Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(3), pages 315-333.
    9. Sherwin Rosen, 1982. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 311-323, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bowman, William R. & Mehay, Stephen L., 1999. "Graduate education and employee performance: evidence from military personnel," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 453-463, October.
    2. Adnan Bashir & Zahid Siddique, 2023. "Appraising the lifetime private economic returns of postgraduate degrees: Evidence from Pakistan," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-13, December.

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