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Interest Groups, Information Manipulation in the Media, and Public Policy: The Case of the Landless Peasants Movement in Brazil

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  • Lee J. Alston
  • Gary D. Libecap
  • Bernardo Mueller

Abstract

We extend the literature on interest group behavior and policy outcomes by examining how groups with limited resources (votes and campaign contributions) effectively influence government by manipulating media information to voters. Voters in turn lobby politicians to implement the group's preferred policies. In this manner interest groups can secure favorable government actions beyond their size and wealth. This is an important contribution because of the increased role of the media in the information age and because this linkage better explains observed government policies. We develop a multi-principal, multi-task model of interest group behavior and generate the characteristics of interest groups that would be most successful using publicity to secure their policy objectives. We apply the model to the Landless Peasants' Movement in Brazil. We detail how the Landless Peasants' Movement molds information; show the general voter response; and examine the reaction of politicians in changing the timing and nature of policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Lee J. Alston & Gary D. Libecap & Bernardo Mueller, 2010. "Interest Groups, Information Manipulation in the Media, and Public Policy: The Case of the Landless Peasants Movement in Brazil," NBER Working Papers 15865, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15865
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alston Lee J. & Mueller Bernardo, 2018. "Priests, Conflicts and Property Rights: the Impacts on Tenancy and Land Use in Brazil," Man and the Economy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-26, June.
    2. Charles Mueller, 2014. "The Economics of the Brazilian Model of Agricultural Development author-name: Bernardo Mueller," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series iriba_wp01, GDI, The University of Manchester.
    3. Couttenier, Mathieu & Hatte, Sophie, 2016. "Mass media effects on non-governmental organizations," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 57-72.
    4. repec:fgv:epgrbe:v:66:n:1:a:4 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Simeon Alder & Guillermo Ordonez, 2016. "Deceptive Redistribution," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 22, pages 223-239, October.
    6. Mueller, Bernardo, 2022. "Property rights and violence in indigenous land in Brazil," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    7. repec:unu:wpaper:wp2012-95 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Bowser, William & Nelson, Carl H., 2012. "Land institutions, investments, and income diversification : Pathways to economic development for Brazil’s quilombo communities," IFPRI discussion papers 1179, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    9. Petrova, Maria, 2012. "Mass media and special interest groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 17-38.
    10. Uhr, Daniel & Ziero Uhr, Júlia & Mueller, Bernardo, 2012. "Como as ONGs ambientais influenciam a política ambiental brasileira?," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 66(1), March.
    11. Carlos Pestana Barros & Ari Francisco de Araujo Jr. & João Ricardo Faria & João Ricardo Faria, 2013. "Brazilian Land Tenure and Conflicts: The Landless Peasants Movement," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 33(1), pages 47-75, Winter.
    12. Simeon Alder & Guillermo Ordonez, 2016. "Deceptive Redistribution," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 22, pages 223-239, October.
    13. Mueller, Bernardo & Mueller, Charles, 2016. "The political economy of the Brazilian model of agricultural development: Institutions versus sectoral policy," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 12-20.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment

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