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Information, Lobbying and the Legislative Process in the European Union

Author

Listed:
  • Christophe Crombez

    (Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, USA, and Department of Applied Economics, University of Leuven, Belgium crombez@stanford.edu)

Abstract

This article presents spatial models of policy-making in the European Union and focuses on interest group lobbying. It analyzes the two principal legislative procedures: consultation and codecision. Lobbying is modeled as a game of strategic information transmission from an informed lobbyist to uninformed policy makers. The theory characterizes sets of proposals that can be adopted under both procedures and determines the proposers' optimal proposal strategies. It analyzes the lobbyist's lobbying strategies at the proposal and vote stages, and studies policy makers' voting strategies. The article's principal conclusions are that at the proposal stage it is optimal for the lobbyist to lobby a policy maker with preferences close to her own, whereas at the vote stage it is optimal for her to lobby the pivotal policy maker.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Crombez, 2002. "Information, Lobbying and the Legislative Process in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 3(1), pages 7-32, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:3:y:2002:i:1:p:7-32
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116502003001002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Crombez, Christophe, 1996. "Legislative Procedures in the European Community," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(2), pages 199-228, April.
    2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
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    6. Mueller,Dennis C. (ed.), 1997. "Perspectives on Public Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521553773, September.
    7. Kohler-Koch, Beate, 1997. "Organized Interests in the EC and the European Parliament," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 1, May.
    8. Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 287-335, Fall.
    9. Moser, Peter, 1996. "The European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter: What Are the Conditions? A Critique of Tsebelis (1994)," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 834-838, December.
    10. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    11. Tsebelis, George, 1994. "The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 128-142, March.
    12. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1992. "Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 269-292, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eising, Rainer, . "Interest groups in EU policy-making," Living Reviews in European Governance (LREG), Institute for European integration research (EIF).
    2. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/8523 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Marianna Belloc, 2007. "Protection for Sale in the EU," Working Papers in Public Economics 100, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
    4. Belloc, Marianna, 2015. "Information for sale in the European Union," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 130-144.
    5. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/8523 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/8523 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/8523 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Šálka, Jaroslav & Dobšinská, Zuzana & Hricová, Zuzana, 2016. "Factors of political power — The example of forest owners associations in Slovakia," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 88-98.
    9. Cornelia Woll, 2006. "Lobbying in the European Union: From Sui Generis to a Comparative Perspective," Post-Print hal-01021182, HAL.
    10. Gullberg, Anne Therese, 2008. "Lobbying friends and foes in climate policy: The case of business and environmental interest groups in the European Union," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 2954-2962, August.
    11. Massaro, Maria, 2019. "Is business lobbying in the European Union context-dependent? Evidence from the policy field of radio spectrum," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(10).
    12. Okereke, Chukwumerije & McDaniels, Devin, 2012. "To what extent are EU steel companies susceptible to competitive loss due to climate policy?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 203-215.
    13. Jan Beyers & Marcel Hanegraaff, 2017. "Balancing friends and foes: Explaining advocacy styles at global diplomatic conferences," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 461-484, September.

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