Why doesn't Capitalism flow to Poor Countries?
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- Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, 2009. "Why Doesn't Capitalism Flow to Poor Countries?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 40(1 (Spring), pages 285-332.
- Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, 2007. "Why Doesn't Capitalism Flow to Poor Countries?," NBER Working Papers 13164, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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More about this item
Keywords
beliefs; corruption; fairness; legitimacy; ideological externality.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
- P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HPE-2004-04-18 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2004-04-18 (Law and Economics)
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