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On the Optimal Choice of a Monetary Policy Instrument

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  • Andrew Atkeson
  • V. V. Chari
  • Patrick J. Kehoe

Abstract

The optimal choice of a monetary policy instrument depends on how tight and transparent the available instruments are and on whether policymakers can commit to future policies. Tightness is always desirable; transparency is only if policymakers cannot commit. Interest rates, which can be made endogenously tight, have a natural advantage over money growth and exchange rates, which cannot. As prices, interest and exchange rates are more transparent than money growth. All else equal, the best instrument is interest rates and the next-best, exchange rates. These findings are consistent with the observed instrument choices of developed and less-developed economies.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Atkeson & V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2007. "On the Optimal Choice of a Monetary Policy Instrument," NBER Working Papers 13398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13398
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Zafar Hayat & Muhammad Nadim Hanif, 2020. "Assessing the Role of Money versus Interest Rate in Pakistan," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 59(1), pages 101-114.
    3. Manuel Amador & Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2010. "Learning from Prices: Public Communication and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(5), pages 866-907.
    4. Oleksiy Kryvtsov & Malik Shukayev & Alexander Ueberfeldt, 2008. "Adopting Price-Level Targeting under Imperfect Credibility," Staff Working Papers 08-3, Bank of Canada.
    5. Oleksiy Kryvtsov & Malik Shukayev & Alexander Ueberfeldt, 2008. "Adopting Price-Level Targeting under Imperfect Credibility: An Update," Staff Working Papers 08-37, Bank of Canada.
    6. George-Marios Angeletos & Karthik Sastry, 2019. "Managing Expectations without Rational Expectations," 2019 Meeting Papers 1537, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. George-Marios Angeletos & Karthik A. Sastry, 2018. "Managing Expectations: Instruments vs. Targets," NBER Working Papers 25404, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Eka Purwanda & Siti Herni Rochana, 2017. "Measurement of the efficiency of monetary policy," Economic Journal of Emerging Markets, Universitas Islam Indonesia, vol. 9(2), pages 138-149, April.
    9. Marina Halac & Pierre Yared, 2022. "Instrument-Based versus Target-Based Rules," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(1), pages 312-345.
    10. Marcelo de C. Griebeler & Ronald Otto Hillbrecht, 2014. "Convexity of the central bank's loss function and dependence between monetary instruments," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(4), pages 2275-2291.
    11. Chari, V.V. & Pérez, Luis, 2022. "Comment on Iovino, La’O and Mascarenhas, “Optimal Monetary Policy and Disclosure with an Informationally-Constrained Central Banker”," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 173-181.
    12. Virgiliu Midrigan, 2008. "Comment on "Monetary Policy and Business Cycles with Endogenous Entry and Product Variety"," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2007, Volume 22, pages 355-365, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Michael Dotsey & Andreas Hornstein, 2008. "On the implementation of Markov-perfect interest rate and money supply rules: global and local uniqueness," Working Papers 08-30, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E3 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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