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Importing Credibility Through Exchange Rate Pegging

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  • Herrendorf, Berthold

Abstract

This paper employs an optimal taxation framework in order to study the credibility of monetary policy-making in an open economy. Since inflation is, in part, uncontrollable due to stochastic disturbances, the authority's actions cannot be monitored perfectly when the exchange rate floats, thus implying that reputational forces may become ineffective. In contrast, pegging the nominal exchange rate to a low-inflation currency allows perfect monitoring because the exchange rate is, in principle, controllable. For this reason, exchange rate pegging may import credibility and result in the best reputational equilibrium, even though the authority retains the discretion to devalue unexpectedly. Copyright 1997 by Royal Economic Society.
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Suggested Citation

  • Herrendorf, Berthold, 1996. "Importing Credibility Through Exchange Rate Pegging," Economic Research Papers 268695, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:268695
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.268695
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    Cited by:

    1. Dal Bo, Ernesto, 2006. "Committees with supermajority voting yield commitment with flexibility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 573-599, May.
    2. Andrew Atkeson & V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2007. "On the optimal choice of a monetary policy instrument," Staff Report 394, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    3. Laubach, Thomas, 2003. "Signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 985-1009, December.
    4. Nora Abu Asab & Juan Carlos Cuestas, 2017. "The Credibility of a Soft Pegged Exchange Rate in Emerging Market Economies: Evidence from a Panel Data Study," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 18(1), pages 29-51, May.
    5. Alexandre Cunha, 2013. "On the relevance of floating exchange rate policies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(2), pages 357-382, June.
    6. Marie-Noëlle Cales, 1999. "Les enjeux du rattachement des monnaies du Maghreb à l'euro," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 52(2), pages 147-161.
    7. J. Scott Davis & Ippei Fujiwara & Jiao Wang, 2018. "Dealing with Time Inconsistency: Inflation Targeting versus Exchange Rate Targeting," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(7), pages 1369-1399, October.
    8. Piersanti, Giovanni, 2012. "The Macroeconomic Theory of Exchange Rate Crises," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199653126.
    9. Ippei Fujiwara & Scott Davis, 2017. "Dealing with Time-inconsistency: Inflation Targeting vs. Exchange Rate Targeting," 2017 Meeting Papers 795, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Canavan, Chris & Tommasi, Mariano, 1997. "On the credibility of alternative exchange rate regimes," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 101-122, October.
    11. Herrendorf, Berthold, 1999. "Transparency, reputation, and credibility under floating and pegged exchange rates," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 31-50, October.
    12. Herrendorf, Berthold, 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Way of Precommitment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 431-448, July.
    13. Buigut, Steven & Valev, Neven T., 2009. "Benefits from Mutual Restraint in a Multilateral Monetary Union," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 585-594, March.
    14. Andrés VELASCO, 2000. "Exchange-Rate Policies For Developing Countries: What Have We Learned? What Do We Still Not Know?," G-24 Discussion Papers 5, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

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