Consent and Exchange
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Note: LE
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Kathryn E. Spier, 1992. "The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 93-108.
- William P. Rogerson, 1984. "Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 39-53, Spring.
- Bernardo, Antonio E & Talley, Eric & Welch, Ivo, 2000.
"A Theory of Legal Presumptions,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-49, April.
- Antonio Bernardo & Eric L. Talley & Ivo Welch, 1999. "A Theory of Legal Presumptions," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm118, Yale School of Management.
- R. H. Coase, 2013.
"The Problem of Social Cost,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
- Ronald H. Coase, 1960. "The Problem of Social Cost," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 5, pages 87-137, Palgrave Macmillan.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1981. "Risk Sharing through Breach of Contract Remedies," NBER Working Papers 0714, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louise L. Wilde, 1986. "Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 557-566, Winter.
- Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn.
- Polinsky, A Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1988. "The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 151-164, January.
- Urs Schweizer, 2006. "Cooperative Investments Induced by Contract Law," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 134-145, Spring.
- Avery Katz, 1990. "Your Terms or Mine? The Duty to Read the Fine Print in Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(4), pages 518-537, Winter.
- Urs Schweizer, 2006. "Cooperative investments induced by contract law," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 134-145, March.
- George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
- Katz, Avery, 1993. "Transaction Costs and the Legal Mechanics of Exchange: When Should Silence in the Face of an Offer Be Construed as Acceptance?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 77-97, April.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2005. "Economic Analysis of Law," Discussion Papers 05-005, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Lee, Yoon-Ho Alex & Klerman, Daniel, 2016. "The Priest-Klein hypotheses: Proofs and generality," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 59-76.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino, 2019.
"Costly Pretrial Agreements,"
The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(1), pages 159-188.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino, 2016. "Costly Pretrial Agreements," CSEF Working Papers 449, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Immordino, Giovanni, 2019. "Costly pretrial agreements," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 89255, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Felli, Leonardo & Anderlini, Luca & Immordino, Giovanni, 2018. "Costly Pretrial Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 13074, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino, 2018. "Costly Pre-Trial Agreements," Working Papers gueconwpa~18-18-11, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Osborne, Evan, 1999. "Who should be worried about asymmetric information in litigation?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 399-409, September.
- Cary Deck & Paul Pecorino & Michael Solomon, 2024.
"Litigation with negative expected value suits: An experimental analysis,"
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 21(2), pages 244-278, June.
- Cary Deck & Paul Pecorino & Michael Solomon, 2022. "Litigation with Negative Expected Value Suits: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 22-17, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Kathryn E. Spier, 2003. "“Tied to the Mast”: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Contracts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 91-120, January.
- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, 2007.
"Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(4), pages 627-656, December.
- Bruno Deffains & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 2005. "Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process," Post-Print hal-00279241, HAL.
- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, 2006. "Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process," Working Papers of BETA 2006-11, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Guiseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, 2006. "Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-071/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2010.
"Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 18-27, March.
- Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," Cahiers du CEREFIGE 0810, CEREFIGE (Centre Europeen de Recherche en Economie Financiere et Gestion des Entreprises), Universite de Lorraine, revised 2008.
- Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-32, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Thomas Cortade & Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais, 2010. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," Post-Print hal-01815022, HAL.
- Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," MPRA Paper 8995, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," Working Papers hal-04140723, HAL.
- Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil & Tzavara, Dionisia, 2004. "Legal expenses insurance, risk aversion and litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 107-119, March.
- Göller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2014.
"Breach remedies inducing hybrid investments,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 26-38.
- Goller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "Breach Remedies Inducing Hybrid Investments," Working Papers 72, Yale University, Department of Economics.
- Choné, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent, 2010. "Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 271-288, November.
- Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea, 2015.
"Success and failure of bargaining in merger control: The case of asset divestitures,"
Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 254-259.
- Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2008. "Settlement in Merger Cases: Remedies and Litigation," Working Papers hal-04140749, HAL.
- Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2008. "Settlement in Merger Cases: Remedies and Litigation," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-10, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Argenton, Cedric & Wang, Xiaoyu, 2020.
"Litigation and Settlement under Loss Aversion,"
Other publications TiSEM
b6c48abc-9b47-4c3b-848b-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Argenton, Cedric & Wang, Xiaoyu, 2020. "Litigation and Settlement under Loss Aversion," Discussion Paper 2020-002, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Argenton, Cedric & Wang, Xiaoyu, 2020. "Litigation and Settlement under Loss Aversion," Discussion Paper 2020-008, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Argenton, Cedric & Wang, Xiaoyu, 2020. "Litigation and Settlement under Loss Aversion," Other publications TiSEM 3a267c4a-2f7d-41c9-966b-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Daughety, Andrew F. & Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1994.
"Settlement negotiations with two-sided asymmetric information: Model duality, information distribution, and efficiency,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 283-298, September.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency," Game Theory and Information 9403009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Brooks, Richard & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "On and Off Contract Remedies," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 290, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Albert H. Choi & George Triantis, 2021. "Contract Design When Relationship-Specific Investment Produces Asymmetric Information," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(2), pages 219-260.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1995.
"Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 203-221, Summer.
- Daughety, A. & Reinganum, J., 1991. "Keeping Society in the Dark : On the Admissibility of Pretrial Nogotiations as Evidence in Court," Working Papers 91-24, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations As Evidence in Court," Game Theory and Information 9403008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Daughety, Andrew & Reinganum, Jennifer, 1994. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court," Working Papers 94-06, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Anne Duchêne, 2017.
"Patent Litigation Insurance,"
Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 84(2), pages 631-660, June.
- Anne Duchêne, 2015. "Patent Litigation Insurance," Working Papers 2015-621, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
- Michael Faure & Hanneke Luth, 2011. "Behavioural Economics in Unfair Contract Terms," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 337-358, September.
- Alexander Stremitzer, 2012.
"Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 337-359.
- Stremitzer, Alexander, 2008. "Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 242, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-LAW-2007-07-27 (Law and Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13267. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.