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Worker Sorting, Taxes and Health Insurance Coverage

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  • Kevin Lang
  • Hong Kang

Abstract

We develop a model in which firms hire heterogeneous workers but must offer all workers insurance benefits under similar terms. In equilibrium, some firms offer free health insurance, some require an employee premium payment and some do not offer insurance. Making the employee contribution pre-tax lowers the cost to workers of a given employee premium and encourages more firms to charge. This increases the offer rate, lowers the take-up rate, increases (decreases) coverage among high (low) demand groups, with an indeterminate overall effect. We test the model using the expansion of section 125 plans between 1987 and 1996. The results are generally supportive.

Suggested Citation

  • Kevin Lang & Hong Kang, 2007. "Worker Sorting, Taxes and Health Insurance Coverage," NBER Working Papers 13066, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13066
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kahn, Shulamit & Lang, Kevin, 1988. "Efficient Estimation of Structural Hedonic Systems," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(1), pages 157-166, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sayeh S. Nikpay, 2020. "Entrepreneurship And Job Lock: The Interaction Between Tax Subsidies And Health Insurance Regulations," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(1), pages 30-47, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions

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