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The Effects of Offering Health Plan Choice Within Employment‐Based Purchasing Groups

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  • M. Kate Bundorf

Abstract

Employers may offer employees a choice of health plans either to promote competition among plans or to better cater to employee preferences for different types of products. This article examines whether the relationship between the availability of choice and insurance costs and coverage are consistent with these models of employer behavior. The results indicate that employers who offer choice have lower average premiums, primarily because employees are enrolled in less generous plans, and cover a greater proportion of workers than those who do not. The results are consistent with employers offering choice to accommodate diverse worker preferences.

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  • M. Kate Bundorf, 2010. "The Effects of Offering Health Plan Choice Within Employment‐Based Purchasing Groups," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 105-127, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:77:y:2010:i:1:p:105-127
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2009.01338.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pilny, Adam & Wübker, Ansgar & Ziebarth, Nicolas R., 2017. "Introducing risk adjustment and free health plan choice in employer-based health insurance: Evidence from Germany," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 330-351.
    2. DeVaro, Jed & Maxwell, Nan L., 2014. "The elusive wage-benefit trade-off: The case of employer-provided health insurance," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 23-37.
    3. Ines Läufer, 2014. "Das Krankenversicherungssystem in den USA: Bestimmungsparameter des Angebots und der Ausgestaltungformen von Arbeitgeber-Gruppenversicherungen," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 03/2014, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland.
    4. Grzegorz Zimon & Vitalina Babenko & Beata Sadowska & Katarzyna Chudy-Laskowska & Blanka Gosik, 2021. "Inventory Management in SMEs Operating in Polish Group Purchasing Organizations during the COVID-19 Pandemic," Risks, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-16, April.
    5. Rahkovsky, Ilya, 2010. "Exclusive contracts in health insurance," MPRA Paper 27473, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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