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Capital Allocation in Mult-Division Firms: Hurdle Rates vs. Budgets

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  • Robert A. Taggart, Jr.

Abstract

It is common practice for firms to ration capital funds to their divisions, rather than set a price and let the divisions use as much as they want. This appears to be true even when the overall firm faces no rationing in the capital market. This paper offers an interpretation of this phenomenon based on Martin Weitzman's "Prices vs. Quantities" model. It is found that a rationing systemis advantageous when division managers do not perceive the full consequences of their investment decisions for the firm as a whole. By contrast, a pricing system for allocating capital among divisions would be favored when the division managers possess valuable information that cannot be costlessly communicated to headquarters. It is then argued that actual capital budgeting practice in many firms reflects a mixture of these two systems and can thus be interpreted as an attempt to reap both kinds of benefits at once.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert A. Taggart, Jr., 1983. "Capital Allocation in Mult-Division Firms: Hurdle Rates vs. Budgets," NBER Working Papers 1213, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1213
    Note: ME
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin L. Weitzman, 1974. "Prices vs. Quantities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(4), pages 477-491.
    2. M. Harris & C. H. Kriebel & A. Raviv, 1982. "Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(6), pages 604-620, June.
    3. Carleton, Willard T, 1969. "Linear Programming and Capital Budgeting Models: A New Interpretation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 24(5), pages 825-833, December.
    4. M. Therese Flaherty, 1981. "Prices Versus Quantities and Vertical Financial Integration," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 507-525, Autumn.
    5. Weitzman, Martin L, 1978. "Optimal Rewards for Economic Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 683-691, September.
    6. Weingartner, H Martin, 1977. "Capital Rationing: n Authors in Search of a Plot," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(5), pages 1403-1431, December.
    7. Bower, Richard S & Lessard, Donald R, 1973. "An Operational Approach to Risk-Screening," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 28(2), pages 321-337, May.
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