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Information and Consumer Choice: The Value of Publicized Health Plan Ratings

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  • Ginger Zhe Jin
  • Alan T. Sorensen

Abstract

We use data on the enrollment decisions of federal annuitants to estimate the influence of publicized ratings on health plan choice. We focus on the impact of ratings disseminated by the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), and use our estimates to calculate the value of the information. Our approach exploits a novel feature of the data—the availability of nonpublic plan ratings—to correct for a source of bias that is inherent in studies of consumer responsiveness to information on product quality: since publicized ratings are correlated with other quality signals known to consumers (but unobserved by researchers), the estimated influence of ratings is likely to be overstated. We control for this bias by comparing the estimated impact of publicized ratings to the estimated impact of ratings that were never disclosed. The results indicate that NCQA's plan ratings had a meaningful influence on individuals' choices, particularly for individuals choosing a plan for the first time. Although we estimate that a very small fraction of individual decisions were materially affected by the information, for those that were affected the implied utility gains are substantial.

Suggested Citation

  • Ginger Zhe Jin & Alan T. Sorensen, 2005. "Information and Consumer Choice: The Value of Publicized Health Plan Ratings," NBER Working Papers 11514, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11514
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-483, December.
    2. Boyan Jovanovic, 1982. "Truthful Disclosure of Information," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 36-44, Spring.
    3. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
    4. Beaulieu, Nancy Dean, 2002. "Quality information and consumer health plan choices," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 43-63, January.
    5. Scanlon, Dennis P. & Chernew, Michael & McLaughlin, Catherine & Solon, Gary, 2002. "The impact of health plan report cards on managed care enrollment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 19-41, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Justin & Hockenberry, Jason & Chou, Shin-Yi & Yang, Muzhe, 2011. "Do bad report cards have consequences? Impacts of publicly reported provider quality information on the CABG market in Pennsylvania," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 392-407, March.
    2. Suzanne Ruwaard & Rudy Douven, 2014. "Quality and hospital choice for cataract treatments: the winner takes most," CPB Discussion Paper 272, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    3. Pope, Devin G., 2009. "Reacting to rankings: Evidence from "America's Best Hospitals"," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 1154-1165, December.
    4. M. Kate Bundorf & Jonathan Levin & Neale Mahoney, 2012. "Pricing and Welfare in Health Plan Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3214-3248, December.
    5. Suzanne Ruwaard & Rudy Douven, 2014. "Quality and hospital choice for cataract treatments: the winner takes most," CPB Discussion Paper 272.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    6. Sridhar Narayanan & Pradeep Chintagunta & Eugenio Miravete, 2007. "The role of self selection, usage uncertainty and learning in the demand for local telephone service," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 1-34, March.
    7. Bundorf, M. Kate & Chun, Natalie & Goda, Gopi Shah & Kessler, Daniel P., 2009. "Do markets respond to quality information? The case of fertility clinics," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 718-727, May.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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