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The Political Economy of Village Sanitation in South India: Capture or Poor Information?

Author

Listed:
  • Ban, Radu

    (The World Bank)

  • Das Gupta, Monica

    (The World Bank)

  • Rao, Vijayendra

    (The World Bank)

Abstract

Despite efforts to mandate and finance local governments' provision of environmental sanitation services, outcomes remain poor in the villages surveyed in the four South Indian states. The analysis indicates some key issues that appear to hinder improvements in sanitation. Local politicians tend to capture sanitary infrastructure and cleaning services for themselves, while also keeping major village roads reasonably well-served. Their decisions suggest, however, that they neither understand the health benefits of sanitation, nor the negative externalities to their own health if surrounding areas are poorly served. Our findings suggest that improving sanitary outcomes requires disseminating information on the public goods nature of their health benefits, as well as on the local government's responsibilities. It also requires putting public health regulations in place, along with measures to enable accountability in service provision.

Suggested Citation

  • Ban, Radu & Das Gupta, Monica & Rao, Vijayendra, 2008. "The Political Economy of Village Sanitation in South India: Capture or Poor Information?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4802, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4802
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bardhan, Pranab & Mookherjee, Dilip, 2006. "Pro-poor targeting and accountability of local governments in West Bengal," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 303-327, April.
    2. Dilip Mookherjee & Pranab K. Bardhan, 2000. "Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 135-139, May.
    3. World Bank, 2004. "India : Fiscal Decentralization to Rural Governments," World Bank Publications - Reports 14674, The World Bank Group.
    4. Araujo, M. Caridad & Ferreira, Francisco H.G. & Lanjouw, Peter & Özler, Berk, 2008. "Local inequality and project choice: Theory and evidence from Ecuador," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1022-1046, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Patrick Mullen & Divya Nair & Jayati Nigam & Katyayni Seth, 2016. "Urban Health Advantages and Penalties in India," World Bank Publications - Reports 24025, The World Bank Group.
    2. Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Somville, Vincent & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2014. "Elite capture through information distortion: A theoretical essay," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 250-263.
    3. Saraswat, Deepak, 2024. "Gender composition of children and sanitation behavior in India," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    4. Revilla, Ma. Laarni D. & Qu, Fangqi & Seetharam, K E & Rao, Bhanoji, 2021. "“Sanitation” in the Top Development Journals: A Review," ADBI Working Papers 1253, Asian Development Bank Institute.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    access to services; accountability; Accounting; affiliates; agricultural output; agriculture; air; air freight; air transport; Backbone; bank loans; Bank of Tanzania; Banking sector;
    All these keywords.

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