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Dominance and Technology War

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  • Kai A. Konrad

Abstract

Three regimes of technology leadership are compared. Firstly, technological innovation in a unipolar world with one dominant coun try that can sell its technology to a set of small countries. Secondly, competition for leadership between two large countries, with small countries that are independent. Thirdly, a decoupled world in which all small countries are allied with one or the other big country. Small nations fare best when they are independent and large nations engage in leadership competition. Great power nations prefer unipolar leader ship. If there are two big nations, they prefer a decoupled world that is partitioned into zones of ináuence, compared to competing with each other.

Suggested Citation

  • Kai A. Konrad, "undated". "Dominance and Technology War," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2023-12, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    • Handle: RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2023-12
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 209-223, Springer.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    US-China conáict; technology war; technology dominance; unipolar leadership: bipolar competition; decoupling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F43 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Economic Growth of Open Economies
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • F63 - International Economics - - Economic Impacts of Globalization - - - Economic Development
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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