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Gender Division of Labor and Alimony

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Listed:
  • Waka Cheung
  • Yew-Kwang Ng

Abstract

According to the principle of comparative advantage, the gender division of labor is utility enhancing during marriage. However, in the long term it decreases the earning power of the party who specializes in housework. Once the marriage is dissolved she/he will be the losing party and hence should be compensated by the other party, who specializes in paid work which usually involves higher degree in the accumulation of human capital. As an effective means of compensation, it is shown formally that alimony may promote the gender division of labor and improve Pareto efficiency. The rule of remarriage termination of alimony is doubly inefficient by reducing gender division of labor and by discouraging efficient remarriages.

Suggested Citation

  • Waka Cheung & Yew-Kwang Ng, 2011. "Gender Division of Labor and Alimony," Monash Economics Working Papers 17-11, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:mos:moswps:2011-17
    as

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    File URL: http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/eco/research/papers/2011/1711genderdivisioncheungng.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Gender; division of labor; alimony; spousal support; marriage; specialization.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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