Constitutional Rules and Efficient Policies
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Luca Bettarelli & Michela Cella & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Elena Manzoni, 2021.
"It’s a matter of confidence. Institutions, government stability and economic outcomes,"
Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 38(2), pages 709-738, July.
- Luca Bettarelli & Michela Cella & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Elena Manzoni, 2015. "It's a matter of confidence: Institutions, government stability and economic outcomes," Working Papers 309, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2015.
- Bettareli, Luca & Cella, Michela & Iannantuoni, Giovanna & Manzoni, Elena, 2017. "It's a matter of confidence: Institutions, government stability and economic outcomes," MPRA Paper 77546, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
Keywords
presidential system; parliamentary system; comparison con dence vote; hierarchical accountability;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2014-03-15 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2014-03-15 (Positive Political Economics)
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