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Is Tax Compliance a Social Norm? A Field Experiment

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  • Pietro Battiston
  • Simona Gamba

Abstract

We study the effect of social pressure on tax compliance, focusing on the compliance of shop sellers to the legal obligation of releasing tax receipts for each sale. We carry out a field experiment on bakeries in Italy, where a strong gap exists between the legal obligation and the actual behavior of sellers. Social pressure is manipulated by means of an explicit request for a receipt when not released. We find that a single request for a receipt causes a 17 per cent rise in the probability of a receipt being released for a sale occurring shortly thereafter. This provides evidence of a social fiscal multiplier: on average, a single request for a receipt causes 2.38 additional receipts being released overall.

Suggested Citation

  • Pietro Battiston & Simona Gamba, 2013. "Is Tax Compliance a Social Norm? A Field Experiment," Working Papers 249, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2013.
  • Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:249
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    File URL: http://repec.dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper249.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Thu Hien Nguyen, 2022. "The Impact of Non-Economic Factors on Voluntary Tax Compliance Behavior: A Case Study of Small and Medium Enterprises in Vietnam," Economies, MDPI, vol. 10(8), pages 1-18, July.
    3. Engel, Christoph & Zamir, Eyal, 2024. "Is transparency a blessing or a curse? An experimental horse race between accountability and extortionary corruption," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax evasion; field experiments; social norms; social pressure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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