Pre-CEO Executive Skill Accumulation and Firm-CEO Matching with Pay Limits
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More about this item
Keywords
Pre-CEO Executive Skill Accumulation; CEO Pay Limits; Firm-CEO matching;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HRM-2016-04-23 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
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