Interactions between Explicit and Implicit Contracting: Evidence from California Agriculture
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DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.6068
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Cited by:
- Guo, Di & Hua, Xinyu & Jiang, Kun, 2017. "Agency and strategic contracts: Theory and evidence from R&D agreements in the pharmaceutical industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 37-64.
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Keywords
Agribusiness; Farm Management;Statistics
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