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Power Sharing and Electoral Equilibrium

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  • Alejandro Saporiti

Abstract

This paper considers a model of (consensual) democracy where political parties engage first in electoral competition, and they share policy-making power afterward according with the votes gathered in the election. The paper uncovers the difficulties to guarantee stability in this institutional setting; and it provides a condition of symmetry on parties’ political motivations that ensures the existence of pure strategy equilibrium under a broad family of power sharing rules, ranging from fully proportional to winner-take-all. The equilibrium analysis shows that power sharing and ideology exert a centrifugal force on policy platforms that increases party polarization, with the paradoxical result that consensual democracies can actually lead to more radical electoral campaigns than winner-take-all. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014
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  • Alejandro Saporiti, 2013. "Power Sharing and Electoral Equilibrium," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1301, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    • Handle: RePEc:man:sespap:1301
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    Cited by:

    1. Drouvelis, Michalis & Saporiti, Alejandro & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2014. "Political motivations and electoral competition: Equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 86-115.
    2. Konstantinos Matakos & Orestis Troumpounis & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2015. "Turnout and Polarization Under Alternative Electoral Systems," Studies in Political Economy, in: Norman Schofield & Gonzalo Caballero (ed.), The Political Economy of Governance, edition 127, pages 335-362, Springer.
    3. Christos Mavridis & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, 2018. "Polling in a proportional representation system," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(2), pages 297-312, August.
    4. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2019. "Poisson voting games: proportional rule," Working Papers 11/2019, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    5. Konstantinos Matakos & Riikka Savolainen & Orestis Troumpounis & Janne Tukiainen & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2024. "Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion," Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(4), pages 883-916.
    6. Ronen Gradwohl, 2018. "Voting in the limelight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 65-103, July.
    7. Meroni, Claudia, 2017. "Electoral competition with strategic voters," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 64-66.
    8. Matakos, Konstantinos & Savolainen, Riikka & Troumpounis, Orestis & Tukiainen, Janne & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2018. "Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion," Working Papers 109, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    9. Dimitrios Xefteris & Nicholas Ziros, 2024. "The “invisible hand” of vote markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 62(1), pages 153-165, February.
    10. Xefteris, Dimitrios & Ziros, Nicholas, 2018. "Strategic vote trading under complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 52-58.
    11. Enriqueta Aragonès & Javier Rivas & Áron Tóth, 2019. "Voter Heterogeneity and Political Corruption," Working Papers 1121, Barcelona School of Economics.
    12. Dimitrios Xefteris & Nicholas Ziros, 2017. "Strategic Vote Trading in Power Sharing Systems," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 76-94, May.
    13. Dario Debowicz & Alejandro Saporiti & Yizhi Wang, 2021. "Redistribution, power sharing and inequality concern," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(2), pages 197-228, August.
    14. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2022. "Poisson voting games under proportional rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(3), pages 507-526, April.
    15. Aragonès, Enriqueta & Rivas, Javier & Tóth, Áron, 2020. "Voter heterogeneity and political corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 206-221.
    16. Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris & Nicholas Ziros, 2021. "Vote Trading in Power-Sharing Systems: A Laboratory Investigation," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(636), pages 1849-1882.
    17. Bol, Damien & Matakos, Konstantinos & Troumpounis, Orestis & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2019. "Electoral rules, strategic entry and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    18. Andreas Grunewald & Emanuel Hansen & Gert Pönitzsch, 2020. "Political selection and the optimal concentration of political power," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 273-311, July.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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