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Abandon Ship? Party Brands and Politicians' Responses to a Political Scandal

Author

Listed:
  • Gianmarco Daniele

    (Barcelona Economic Institute (IEB), University of Barcelona (UB), Spain)

  • Sergio Galletta

    (IdEP, Economia, Universita' Svizzera italiana, Switzerland)

  • Benny Geys

    (BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo, Norway)

Abstract

In this article, we study politicians' - rather than voters' - responses to the main political scandal in Italian recent history (Tangentopoli), and overcome endogeneity concerns by analysing the local implications of this national corruption scandal. We find that local politicians withdraw support for incumbents in parties hit by Tangentopoli - inducing increased political instability in such municipalities. Moreover, politicians in parties hit by the scandal exhibit higher rates of party switching and lower re-running rates. Scandals thus appear to decrease the value of the party "brand", and become transmitted across politicians and levels of government via partisan cues.

Suggested Citation

  • Gianmarco Daniele & Sergio Galletta & Benny Geys, 2017. "Abandon Ship? Party Brands and Politicians' Responses to a Political Scandal," IdEP Economic Papers 1703, USI Università della Svizzera italiana.
    • Handle: RePEc:lug:wpidep:1703
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    Cited by:

    1. Cantoni, Enrico & Gazzè, Ludovica & Schafer, Jerome, 2021. "Turnout in concurrent elections: Evidence from two quasi-experiments in Italy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    2. Wioletta Dziuda & William G. Howell, 2021. "Political Scandal: A Theory," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 197-209, January.
    3. Bruno Carvalho & Claudia Custodio & Benny Geys & Diogo Mendes & Susana Peralta, 2020. "Information, Perceptions, and Electoral Behaviour of Young Voters: A Randomised Controlled Experiment," Working Papers ECARES 2020-14, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    4. Cavalcanti, Francisco & Daniele, Gianmarco & Galletta, Sergio, 2018. "Popularity shocks and political selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 201-216.
    5. Le Moglie, Marco & Turati, Gilberto, 2019. "Electoral cycle bias in the media coverage of corruption news," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 140-157.
    6. Altindag, Duha T. & Mocan, Naci & Zhang, Jie, 2021. "Freedom of Speech, Deterrence, and Compellence in the Parliament," IZA Discussion Papers 14308, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Arnstein Aassve & Gianmarco Daniele & Marco Le Moglie, 2018. "Never Forget the First Time: The Persistent Effects of Corruption and the Rise of Populism in Italy," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1896, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    8. Gabriel Natividad, 2022. "Decentralizing investment: Evidence from municipal organization after close elections," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 734-761, August.
    9. Giommoni, Tommaso, 2021. "Exposure to corruption and political participation: Evidence from Italian municipalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    10. Gamalerio, Matteo, 2020. "Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    11. Alessandra Foresta, 2020. "The rise of populist parties in the aftermath of a massive corruption scandal," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 289-306, September.
    12. Rienks, Harm, 2023. "Corruption, scandals and incompetence: Do voters care?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    13. Davide Cipullo, 2023. "When Women Take All: Direct Election and Female Leadership," CESifo Working Paper Series 10229, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Accountability; Corruption; Party Cues; Brands; Multi-level governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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