Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians
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- Eric Avis & Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2018. "Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(5), pages 1912-1964.
- Eric Avis & Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2016. "Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians," NBER Working Papers 22443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eric Avis & Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2016. "Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption: Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians," Working Papers id:11148, eSocialSciences.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
- O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
- O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
- O54 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Latin America; Caribbean
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DEV-2016-07-23 (Development)
- NEP-LAM-2016-07-23 (Central and South America)
- NEP-LAW-2016-07-23 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-POL-2016-07-23 (Positive Political Economics)
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