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Gender discrimination and efficiency in marriage: The bargaining family under scrutiny

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  • Rainer, Helmut

Abstract

We consider a repeated family bargaining model that links the topics of employment and households. A key aspect of the model is that marital bargaining power is determined endogenously. We show that: (1) the efficiency of household decisions is sometimes inversely related to the prevailing degree of gender discrimination in labor markets; (2) women who are discriminated against have difficulty enforcing cooperative household outcomes because they may be extremely limited to credibly punish opportunistic behavior by their male partners; (3) the likelihood that sharing rules such as \"equal sharing\" are maintained throughout a marriage relationship is highest when men and women face equal opportunities in labor markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Rainer, Helmut, 2008. "Gender discrimination and efficiency in marriage: The bargaining family under scrutiny," Munich Reprints in Economics 19817, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:19817
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    Cited by:

    1. Tatiana Damjanovic & Geethanjali Selvaretnam, 2020. "Economic Growth and Evolution of Gender Equality," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 88(1), pages 1-36, January.
    2. Sigve Tjøtta & Kjell Vaage, 2008. "Public transfers and marital dissolution," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 21(2), pages 419-437, April.
    3. Jafarey, Saqib & Maiti, Dibyendu, 2015. "Glass slippers and glass ceilings: An analysis of marital anticipation and female education," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 45-61.
    4. Akira Yakita, 2018. "Fertility and education decisions and child-care policy effects in a Nash-bargaining family model," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 31(4), pages 1177-1201, October.
    5. Mizuki Komura, 2013. "Fertility and endogenous gender bargaining power," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 26(3), pages 943-961, July.
    6. Anne-Kathrin Bronsert & Amihai Glazer & Kai A. Konrad, 2017. "Old money, the nouveaux riches and Brunhilde’s marriage strategy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 163-186, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
    • J82 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Labor Force Composition
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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