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Influence de la négociation intra-ménage sur les dépenses d’éducation dans les ménages au Mali
[Influence of intra-household bargaining on education expenditures in households in Mali]

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  • Keita, Moussa

Abstract

The household's consumption expenditures decisions are usually analyzed assuming that household members pool their income (Income Pooling Hypothesis). According to this hypothesis, household’s expenditure pattern is influenced only by the total income and not by the amounts of individual contributions. This means for example that in a couple, the increase in the relative income of one or the other spouse have the same impact on the structure and distribution of household’s expenditures. In this case, the bargaining power associated with the individuals in the household would have no effect on either the structure or the distribution of expenditure within the household. This study is attempting to test this hypothesis by taking the specific case of education expenditures on a sample of 2,412 households in Mali. Our estimations show that women’s intra-household decision power has a significantly different effect from that of man on education expenditures. This result thus calls into question the relevance of the unitary model in analyzing household expenditures choices concerning investment in children human capital.

Suggested Citation

  • Keita, Moussa, 2011. "Influence de la négociation intra-ménage sur les dépenses d’éducation dans les ménages au Mali [Influence of intra-household bargaining on education expenditures in households in Mali]," MPRA Paper 57592, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:57592
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pouvoir de négociation; dépenses d’éducation; modèle unitaire; modèle collectif;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C12 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Hypothesis Testing: General
    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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