A Formal Theory of Firm Boundaries: A Trade-Off between Rent Seeking and Bargaining Costs
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2013-06-24 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2013-06-24 (Microeconomics)
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