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Gambling Reputation: Repeated Bargaining With Outside Options

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  • Jihong Lee
  • Qingmin Liu

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Jihong Lee & Qingmin Liu, 2013. "Gambling Reputation: Repeated Bargaining With Outside Options," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1601-1672, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:81:y:2013:i:4:p:1601-1672
    DOI: ECTA9200
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bowen, Renee & Hwang, Ilwoo & Krasa, Stefan, 2022. "Personal power dynamics in bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    2. Ilwoo Hwang, 2013. "A Theory of Bargaining Deadlock," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-050, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    3. Soeren Johansen & Anders Rygh Swensen, 2021. "Adjustment coefficients and exact rational expectations in cointegrated vector autoregressive models," Discussion Papers 21-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    4. Bowen, T. Renee & Krasa, Stefan & Hwang, Ilwoo, 2020. "Agenda-Setter Power Dynamics: Learning in Multi-Issue Bargaining," CEPR Discussion Papers 15406, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Suchan Chae & Seho Kim, 2019. "The effects of third-party transfers in sequential anchored bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 143-155, March.
    6. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2019. "Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation," ISER Discussion Paper 1060, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    7. Starkov, Egor, 2023. "Only time will tell: Credible dynamic signaling," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    8. Hubert Kempf, 2021. "Fiscal Federalism in a Monetary Union: The No-Cooperation Pitfall," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 109-151, February.
    9. Honryo, Takakazu, 2018. "Dynamic persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 36-58.
    10. Hwang, Ilwoo, 2018. "A theory of bargaining deadlock," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 501-522.
    11. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2021. "Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation [Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model]," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 1981-2021.
    12. Dilmé, Francesc, 2017. "Noisy signaling in discrete time," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 13-25.
    13. Hwang, Ilwoo & Li, Fei, 2017. "Transparency of outside options in bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 116-147.
    14. Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation Effects Under Interdependent Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 2175-2202, September.
    15. Qingmin Liu & Konrad Mierendorff & Xianwen Shi & Weijie Zhong, 2019. "Auctions with Limited Commitment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(3), pages 876-910, March.
    16. Yusuke Mori, 2013. "A Formal Theory of Firm Boundaries: A Trade-Off between Rent Seeking and Bargaining Costs," Discussion Paper Series DP2013-20, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.

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