Risk Sharing and Employee Motivation in Competitive Search Equilibrium
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References listed on IDEAS
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 149-173, November.
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Cited by:
- Colin P. Green & John S. Heywood, 2016. "Don't Forget the Gravy! Are Bonuses Just Added on Top of Salaries?," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 490-513, July.
- Colin Green & John Heywood, 2012. "Don't Forget the Gravy! Are Bonuses and Time Rates Complements?," Working Papers 13424023, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
- Kunio Tsuyuhara, 2016. "Dynamic Contracts With Worker Mobility Via Directed On‐The‐Job Search," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(4), pages 1405-1424, November.
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More about this item
Keywords
Effort; bonus; risk aversion; competitive search; equilibrium efficiency;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2010-10-23 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2010-10-23 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-DGE-2010-10-23 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-LAB-2010-10-23 (Labour Economics)
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