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The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking

Author

Listed:
  • Kohei Daido

    (Kwansei Gakuin University)

  • Takeshi Murooka

    (Osaka University)

Abstract

We study multitasking problems where an agent engages in both a contractible task and a non-contractible task, which are substitutes. The agent has private information on the value of the non-contractible task, and there are followers who can also contribute to this task. We highlight a new mechanism by incorporating leading-by-example (Hermalin, 1998) in a multi-tasking model. To prevent excessive effort by the agent with low value on the non-contractible task, the principal provides high-powered incentives for the contractible task. We discuss its organizational implications to pay for performance, incentives to help colleagues, and prevention of overwork.

Suggested Citation

  • Kohei Daido & Takeshi Murooka, 2022. "The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking," Discussion Paper Series 242, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University.
    • Handle: RePEc:kgu:wpaper:242
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multitasking; Signaling; Leadership; Pay for Performance; Help; Overwork;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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