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Electoral outcomes versus voters’ preferences: On the different tales the data can tell

Author

Listed:
  • Salvatore Barbaro

    (Johannes-Gutenberg University, Germany)

  • Anna-Sophie Kurella

    (University of Mannheim, Germany)

  • Maike Roth

    (Johannes-Gutenberg University, Germany)

Abstract

One of the primary goals of the social sciences is to understand the factors influencing fluctuations in support for political parties. However, the relationship between electoral outcomes and electorate preferences can be tenuous. The aggregation function’s impact on translating voters’ preferences into outcomes can vary significantly. Conversely, electoral outcomes may not accurately reflect how voters perceive winning or losing parties. Through an empirical case study, we examine short and long-term data. Our analysis reveals several key findings: Firstly, applying different electoral methods yields significantly divergent outcomes. Secondly, electoral trends do not necessarily align with voters’ perceptions of the respective parties over time. Lastly, plurality-based methods can result in seat share gains for parties even in the face of declining support.

Suggested Citation

  • Salvatore Barbaro & Anna-Sophie Kurella & Maike Roth, 2024. "Electoral outcomes versus voters’ preferences: On the different tales the data can tell," Working Papers 2412, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
    • Handle: RePEc:jgu:wpaper:2412
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    File URL: https://download.uni-mainz.de/RePEc/pdf/Discussion_Paper_2412.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Elections; Voting Schemes;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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