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Plurality Rule, Majority Principle and Indeterminacy in German Elections

Author

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  • Salvatore Barbaro
  • Nils D. Steiner

Abstract

In German federal elections, district representatives are chosen by plurality rule - a voting system that can fail to select the Condorcet winner. With heightened party system fragmentation, violations of the Condorcet criterion may become increasingly frequent. In light of the "horseshoe theory", it also becomes questionable whether Condorcet winners exist in the first place. In this study, we simulate preference orderings over district candidates for the 2017 Bundestag election based on survey data. The simulation identifies Condorcet winners in every district and indicates that plurality rule fails to select those in about one in ten districts.

Suggested Citation

  • Salvatore Barbaro & Nils D. Steiner, 2023. "Plurality Rule, Majority Principle and Indeterminacy in German Elections," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 79(1), pages 64-91.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:doi:10.1628/fa-2023-0001
    DOI: 10.1628/fa-2023-0001
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    Cited by:

    1. Salvatore Barbaro & Anna-Sophie Kurella & Maike Roth, 2024. "Electoral outcomes versus voters’ preferences: On the different tales the data can tell," Working Papers 2412, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    elections; Condorcetwinners; pluralityrule; simple-majorityrule; indeterminacy; horseshoetheory; Germannationalelections;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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