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Controlling Contractual Exchange Risks in R&D-Interfirm-Cooperation: An Empirical Study

Author

Listed:
  • Roland Helm

    (University of Jena, Faculty of Economics)

  • Martin Kloyer

    (University of Jena, Faculty of Economics)

Abstract

Suppliers and buyers of R&D-results perceive two exchange risks: first, the risk to achieve a lower profitability on the innovation return than the exchange partner, second, the risk of the partner becoming a competitor by unplanned, one-sided knowledge flows. Both risks motivate opportunistic behaviour. This paper deals with the reduction of the perceived supplier risks. The contractually guaranteed option on later negotiation of a continuous innovation return sharing is introduced. This option has not been considered as an instrument against exchange risks in theory, yet. The basis for such an option are contractual hostages. An empirical study analyses how effectively contractual hostages lower the perceived risks.

Suggested Citation

  • Roland Helm & Martin Kloyer, 2003. "Controlling Contractual Exchange Risks in R&D-Interfirm-Cooperation: An Empirical Study," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft (Expired!) 17/2003, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    • Handle: RePEc:jen:jenasw:2003-17
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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Furlotti, 2007. "There is more to contracts than incompleteness: a review and assessment of empirical research on inter-firm contract design," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 11(1), pages 61-99, March.
    2. Kretschmer, Tobias & Banal-Estanol, Albert & Seldeslachts, Jo & Meloso, Debrah, 2017. "The Contingent Effect of Alliance Design on Alliance Dynamics and Performance: An Experimental Study," CEPR Discussion Papers 12512, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Bonte, Werner & Keilbach, Max, 2005. "Concubinage or marriage? Informal and formal cooperations for innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 279-302, April.
    4. Lee, Jeho & Park, Seung Ho & Ryu, Young & Baik, Yoon-Suk, 2010. "A hidden cost of strategic alliances under Schumpeterian dynamics," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 229-238, March.
    5. Christian Engel & Ricky Hanzel & Roland Helm, 2015. "Gestaltung von internationalen Service-Netzwerken im industriellen Anlagengeschäft," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 67(69), pages 79-94, January.
    6. Kloyer, Martin & Scholderer, Joachim, 2012. "Effective incomplete contracts and milestones in market-distant R&D collaboration," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 346-357.
    7. João Augusto Ferreira Freire & Eduardo Gonçalves, 2022. "Cooperation in Innovative Efforts: a Systematic Literature Review," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 13(4), pages 3364-3400, December.
    8. Roland Helm & Herbert Endres & Stefan Hüsig, 2019. "When and how often to externally commercialize technologies? a critical review of outbound open innovation," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 327-345, April.
    9. Roland Helm & Martin Kloyer & Christin Aust, 2018. "R&D Collaboration Between Firms: Hard And Soft Antecedents Of Supplier Knowledge Sharing," International Journal of Innovation Management (ijim), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 24(01), pages 1-42, December.

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