Coûts de transaction et contrats incomplets
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DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.2002.1518
Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2002.1518
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- M'Hand Fares & Stéphane Saussier, 2002. "Coûts de transaction et contrats incomplets," Post-Print hal-02494058, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Olivier Sautel, 2007. "L'évolution de la théorie des contrats incomplets face à la dé-intégration verticale," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(1), pages 5-5.
- Fabienne Fecher & Benoît Lévesque, 2008. "The Public Sector And The Social Economy In The Annals (1975–2007): Towards A New Paradigm," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(3‐4), pages 679-727, September.
- Déprés, Christophe & Grolleau, Gilles & Mzoughi, Naoufel, 2005.
"Analyse exploratoire de quelques stratégies de fourniture ‘non publique’ des biens ‘publics’,"
Cahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), vol. 74.
- Christophe Déprés & Gilles Grolleau & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2005. "Analyse exploratoire de quelques stratégies de fourniture ‘non publique’ des biens ‘publics’," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 74, pages 27-45.
- Christophe Depres & Gilles Grolleau & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2005. "Analyse exploratoire de quelques stratégies de fourniture ‘non publique’ des biens ‘publics’," Post-Print hal-01201091, HAL.
- Darine Bakkour, 2013. "L’approche contractuelle du concept de gouvernance," Studies and Syntheses 13-04, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Dec 2013.
- Veronique Thireau, 2011. "Economie du nucléaire et contentieux," Post-Print hal-01221360, HAL.
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