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May There Be Victory: Government Election Performance and the World's Largest Public-Works Program

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  • Zimmermann, Laura V

    (University of Georgia)

Abstract

A number of developing country governments have introduced ambitious anti-poverty programs in recent years, but the dynamic effects of these initiatives on governments' election performance remain poorly understood. Especially in contexts with low program implementation quality, public support for government interventions may be high initially but decline over time as citizens observe the actual program benefits. This paper analyzes the election impacts of the largest public-works program in the world, the Indian NREGS. Using a regression-discontinuity framework, the results suggest that length of program exposure and implementation quality matter: voter support in low implementation quality areas declines with longer program access. This effect is muted in well-implemented areas, where voter turnout is higher and incumbents of any party affiliation also benefit. The government payoff from implementing a large anti-poverty program may therefore be short-lived unless implementation challenges are resolved.

Suggested Citation

  • Zimmermann, Laura V, 2015. "May There Be Victory: Government Election Performance and the World's Largest Public-Works Program," IZA Discussion Papers 9161, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9161
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    Cited by:

    1. Khanna, Gaurav & Zimmermann, Laura, 2017. "Guns and butter? Fighting violence with the promise of development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 120-141.
    2. Das, Upasak & Maiorano, Diego, 2019. "Post-clientelistic initiatives in a patronage democracy: The distributive politics of India’s MGNREGA," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 239-252.
    3. Ankush Goyal & Rajender Kumar, 2022. "Does Social Welfare Programmes Influence Households Trust in Local Administration and Their Political Participation? Evidence from the MGNREG Scheme in India," Indian Journal of Human Development, , vol. 16(3), pages 602-617, December.
    4. Diego Maiorano, 2019. "The 2019 Indian Elections and the Ruralization of the BJP," Studies in Indian Politics, , vol. 7(2), pages 176-190, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    NREGS; election outcomes; India; anti-poverty programs; voting behavior;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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