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Guns and butter? Fighting violence with the promise of development

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  • Khanna, Gaurav
  • Zimmermann, Laura

Abstract

There is growing awareness that development-oriented government policies may be an important counterinsurgency strategy, but existing papers are usually unable to disentangle various mechanisms. Using a regression-discontinuity design, we analyze the impact of one of the world's largest anti-poverty programs, India's NREGS, on the intensity of Maoist conflict. We find short-run increases of insurgency-related violence, police-initiated attacks, and insurgent attacks on civilians. We discuss how these results relate to established theories in the literature. One mechanism consistent with the empirical patterns is that NREGS induces civilians to share more information with the state, improving police effectiveness.

Suggested Citation

  • Khanna, Gaurav & Zimmermann, Laura, 2017. "Guns and butter? Fighting violence with the promise of development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 120-141.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:124:y:2017:i:c:p:120-141
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.09.006
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public-works program; National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme; India; Regression-discontinuity design; Conflict;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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