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Getting Disabled Workers Back to Work: How Important Are Economic Incentives?

Author

Listed:
  • Fevang, Elisabeth

    (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research)

  • Hardoy, Inés

    (Institute for Social Research, Oslo)

  • Røed, Knut

    (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research)

Abstract

We investigate the impacts of economic incentives on the duration and outcome of temporary disability insurance (TDI) spells. The analysis is based on a large quasi-experiment in Norway, with a complete overhaul of the TDI benefit system. Our findings show that the labor supply of TDI claimants responds to both the benefit-level and to the level of local labor demand. The estimated elasticity of the employment hazard with respect to the benefit-level is – 0.3. We also find that the level of TDI benefits significantly affects the transition rate to alternative social insurance programs such as permanent disability and unemployment.

Suggested Citation

  • Fevang, Elisabeth & Hardoy, Inés & Røed, Knut, 2013. "Getting Disabled Workers Back to Work: How Important Are Economic Incentives?," IZA Discussion Papers 7137, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7137
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Markussen, Simen & Røed, Knut, 2014. "The impacts of vocational rehabilitation," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 1-13.
    2. Koning, Pierre & van Sonsbeek, Jan-Maarten, 2017. "Making disability work? The effects of financial incentives on partially disabled workers," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 202-215.
    3. Simen Markussen & Knut Røed, 2016. "Leaving Poverty Behind? The Effects of Generous Income Support Paired with Activation," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 180-211, February.
    4. Demianova, Anna & Lukiyanova, Anna, 2016. "The impact of disability status on labor supply in Russia," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 44, pages 50-74.
    5. Andersson, Josefine, 2018. "Financial incentives to work for disability insurance recipients - Sweden’s special rules for continuous deduction," Working Paper Series 2018:7, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    hazard rate models; rehabilitation; temporary disability; labor supply;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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