Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame: When Declaring a Single Person Responsible Solves a Free Rider Problem
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- Li, Xinyu & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2024. "Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame: When Declaring a Single Person Responsible Sovles a Free Rider Problem," EconStor Preprints 306485, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
formal and real responsibility; collective punishment; reputation free riding;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
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