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A Class Of Social Choice Mechanisms Possessing Pure-Strategy Nash Equilbria

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  • Gardner, Roy J.

Abstract

A class of social choice mechanisms is described. Each mechanism in the class, when viewed as a noncooperative game, is shown to possess at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Some members of the class are useful in social choice applications.

Suggested Citation

  • Gardner, Roy J., 1977. "A Class Of Social Choice Mechanisms Possessing Pure-Strategy Nash Equilbria," ISU General Staff Papers 197704010800001056, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:197704010800001056
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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