IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ieb/wpaper/doc2009-33.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Sharing the blame? Local electoral accountability and centralized school finance in California

Author

Listed:
  • Marcelin Joanis

    (Université de Sherbrooke)

Abstract

While electoral accountability should be stronger when responsibilities are clearly assigned to one political office, the involvement of higher tiers of government is often associated with policies specifically designed to improve local accountability. This paper investigates the impact of centralization on local electoral accountability in the context of California’s school finance system. Results show that voters are responsive to differences in dropout rates and pupil-teacher ratios, and that incumbents are less likely to be reelected when a district’s degree of centralization is high. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 appears to have sharpened local electoral accountability.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcelin Joanis, 2009. "Sharing the blame? Local electoral accountability and centralized school finance in California," Working Papers 2009/33, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    • Handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2009-33
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ieb.ub.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/2009-IEB-WorkingPaper-33.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fernando Ferreira & Joseph Gyourko, 2009. "Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from U.S. Cities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(1), pages 399-422.
    2. Alesina, Alberto & Londregan, John & Rosenthal, Howard, 1993. "A Model of the Political Economy of the United States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 12-33, March.
    3. Hoxby, Caroline M., 1999. "The productivity of schools and other local public goods producers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 1-30, October.
    4. Rainald Borck, 2008. "Central versus local education finance: a political economy approach," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(3), pages 338-352, June.
    5. Eric A. Hanushek & Margaret E. Raymond, 2005. "Does school accountability lead to improved student performance?," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(2), pages 297-327.
    6. Justine S. Hastings & Jeffrey M. Weinstein, 2007. "No Child Left Behind: Estimating the Impact on Choices and Student Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 13009, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Arzaghi, Mohammad & Henderson, J. Vernon, 2005. "Why countries are fiscally decentralizing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1157-1189, July.
    8. George M. Holmes, "undated". "Does school choice increase school quality?," Working Papers 0106, East Carolina University, Department of Economics.
    9. Megan Mullin, 2008. "The Conditional Effect of Specialized Governance on Public Policy," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(1), pages 125-141, January.
    10. Thomas J. Nechyba, 2003. "Centralization, Fiscal Federalism, and Private School Attendance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(1), pages 179-204, February.
    11. Caroline M. Hoxby, 2001. "All School Finance Equalizations are Not Created Equal," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(4), pages 1189-1231.
    12. Card, David & Payne, A. Abigail, 2002. "School finance reform, the distribution of school spending, and the distribution of student test scores," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 49-82, January.
    13. Feld, Lars P. & Schaltegger, Christoph A. & Schnellenbach, Jan, 2008. "On government centralization and fiscal referendums," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 611-645, May.
    14. Marcelin Joanis, 2008. "Intertwined Federalism: Accountability Problems under Partial Decentralization," Cahiers de recherche 08-22, Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
    15. Derek Neal & Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, 2010. "Left Behind by Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based Accountability," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 92(2), pages 263-283, May.
    16. Caroline M. Hoxby, 1999. "The Productivity of Schools and Other Local Public Goods Providers," NBER Working Papers 6911, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Murray, Sheila E & Evans, William N & Schwab, Robert M, 1998. "Education-Finance Reform and the Distribution of Education Resources," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 789-812, September.
    18. Jacobson, Gary C., 1989. "Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946–86," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 773-793, September.
    19. Eric J. Brunner & Jon Sonstelie, 2006. "California's School Finance Reform: An Experiment in Fiscal Federalism," Working papers 2006-09, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Benny Geys & Jan Vermeir, 2014. "Party Cues In Elections Under Multilevel Governance: Theory And Evidence From Us States," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 1029-1058, August.
    2. Cassette, Aurélie & Farvaque, Etienne, 2016. "A dirty deed done dirt cheap: Reporting the blame of a national reform on local politicians," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 127-144.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Marcelin Joanis, 2013. "Sharing the Blame? Local Electoral Accountability and Centralized School Finance in California," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 335-359, November.
    2. Eric J. Brunner & Jon Sonstelie, 2006. "California's School Finance Reform: An Experiment in Fiscal Federalism," Working papers 2006-09, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    3. Davis, Matthew & Ferreira, Fernando, 2022. "Housing disease and public school finances," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    4. Baicker, Katherine & Clemens, Jeffrey & Singhal, Monica, 2012. "The rise of the states: U.S. fiscal decentralization in the postwar period," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 1079-1091.
    5. Rucker C. Johnson & C. Kirabo Jackson, 2019. "Reducing Inequality through Dynamic Complementarity: Evidence from Head Start and Public School Spending," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 310-349, November.
    6. James Alm & Robert D. Buschman & David L. Sjoquist, 0. "Citizen "Trust" as an Explanation of State Education Funding to Local School Districts," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 41(4), pages 636-661.
    7. Ludger Wößmann, 2006. "Bildungspolitische Lehren aus den internationalen Schülertests: Wettbewerb, Autonomie und externe Leistungsüberprüfung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7(3), pages 417-444, August.
    8. Katherine Baicker & Nora Gordon, 2004. "The Effect of Mandated State Education Spending on Total Local Resources (new title: The effect of state education finance reform on total local resources)," CESifo Working Paper Series 1275, CESifo.
    9. Eric Brunner & Joshua Hyman & Andrew Ju, 2020. "School Finance Reforms, Teachers' Unions, and the Allocation of School Resources," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 473-489, July.
    10. Millimet, Daniel L. & Rangaprasad, Vasudha, 2007. "Strategic competition amongst public schools," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 199-219, March.
    11. Joydeep Roy, 2011. "Impact of School Finance Reform on Resource Equalization and Academic Performance: Evidence from Michigan," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 6(2), pages 137-167, April.
    12. Daniel J. Henderson & Léopold Simar & Le Wang, 2017. "The three s of public schools: irrelevant inputs, insufficient resources and inefficiency," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(12), pages 1164-1184, March.
    13. C. Kirabo Jackson & Rucker C. Johnson & Claudia Persico, 2016. "The Effects of School Spending on Educational and Economic Outcomes: Evidence from School Finance Reforms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(1), pages 157-218.
    14. C. Kirabo Jackson & Rucker Johnson & Claudia Persico, 2014. "The Effect of School Finance Reforms on the Distribution of Spending, Academic Achievement, and Adult Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 20118, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Thomas Fuchs & Ludger Wößmann, 2008. "What accounts for international differences in student prformance? A re-examination using PISA data," Studies in Empirical Economics, in: Christian Dustmann & Bernd Fitzenberger & Stephen Machin (ed.), The Economics of Education and Training, pages 209-240, Springer.
    16. Mario Jametti & Marcelin Joanis, 2020. "Elections and de facto expenditure decentralization in Canada," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 275-297, September.
    17. William N. Evans & Robert M. Schwab & Kathryn L. Wagner, 2019. "The Great Recession and Public Education," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 14(2), pages 298-326, Spring.
    18. Mario Jametti & Marcelin Joanis, 2010. "Determinants of fiscal decentralization: political economy aspects," Working Papers 2010/7, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    19. Matthew Davis & Fernando V. Ferreira, 2017. "Housing Disease and Public School Finances," NBER Working Papers 24140, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Josep-Oriol Escardíbul & Nehal Helmy, 2015. "Decentralisation and school autonomy impact on the quality of education: the case of two MENA countries," Working Papers 2015/33, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    centralization; accountability; school finance; local elections; shared responsibility; No Child Left Behind;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2009-33. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iebubes.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.