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Repercusiones electorales del Consenso de Washington

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  • Eduardo Lora
  • Mauricio Olivera

Abstract

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este trabajo se evalúa la manera en que los resultados electorales tanto en comicios presidenciales como legislativos en América Latina se han visto afectados por la adopción de políticas económicas concebidas para mejorar la estabilidad macroeconómica y facilitar el funcionamiento de los mercados. La base de datos incluye 17 países latinoamericanos durante el período 1985-2002, y un total de 66 elecciones presidenciales y 81 legislativas. El conjunto de hipótesis que se pueden poner a prueba proviene de un repaso de la obra publicada y se estructura alrededor de la hipótesis de la economía del voto. Se descubre que (i) se recompensa al partido oficialista si se produce una baja de la inflación y, en menor medida, si aumenta la tasa de crecimiento; (ii) mientras más fragmentado o ideológicamente polarizado sea el sistema partidista, mayores serán las recompensas electorales que genere una reducción de la inflación o un aumento del crecimiento económico, (iii) los electores se interesan no sólo por los resultados económicos, sino también por algunas de las políticas adoptadas: aunque el electorado parece no tomar en cuenta cuestiones macroeconómicas tales como las políticas fiscales o cambiarias, es contrario a las políticas favorables al mercado, independientemente de los efectos que éstas puedan tener en el crecimiento o la inflación, y (iv) el electorado es más tolerante de las reformas a favor del mercado cuando el partido oficialista tiene una ideología más orientada al mercado. Estos resultados sugieren que a los partidos reformistas les ha salido caro adoptar reformas de mercado, salvo en aquellos casos en que las mismas se hayan acometido conjuntamente con políticas de estabilización en economías altamente inflacionarias.

Suggested Citation

  • Eduardo Lora & Mauricio Olivera, 2005. "Repercusiones electorales del Consenso de Washington," Research Department Publications 4406, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4406
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