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Mandates, Powers, and Policies

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  • Gregg B. Johnson
  • Brian F. Crisp

Abstract

Elections provide a mandate to pursue a set of policies. Party label provides a concise ideological cue for voters to choose among candidates, and research on industrial democracies verifies a link between the parties voters elect and subsequent policy outcomes. The combination of inchoate party systems and economic vulnerability elsewhere may weaken the link between voter choice and policy. When examining economic policies in Latin America, there is some controversy as to whether governments carried out “reform by surprise”—promising one thing during a campaign while implementing another in office. We test whether the ideological reputations of executives’ and legislators’ parties explain whether they adopt market‐oriented policies. We find that the future behavior of presidential candidates is difficult for voters to predict. However, the ideological reputation of legislators is a reliable predictor of policy outcomes, and the relationship is clarified by the prospects of collective action by legislative delegations.

Suggested Citation

  • Gregg B. Johnson & Brian F. Crisp, 2003. "Mandates, Powers, and Policies," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(1), pages 128-142, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:47:y:2003:i:1:p:128-142
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-5907.00009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paunovic, Igor, 2000. "Growth and reforms in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s," Series Históricas 7604, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    2. Eduardo Lora, 1997. "A Decade of Structural Reform in Latin America: What Has Been Reformed and How to Measure It," Research Department Publications 4074, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    3. Bacha, Edmar L. & Feinberg, Richard E., 1986. "The World Bank and structural adjustment in Latin America," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 333-346, March.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eduardo Lora & Mauricio Olivera, 2005. "The Electoral Consequences of the Washington Consensus," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 1-61, January.
    2. Le Anh Nguyen Long & Megan Foster & Gwen Arnold, 2019. "The impact of stakeholder engagement on local policy decision making," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 52(4), pages 549-571, December.
    3. Eduardo Lora & Mauricio Olivera, 2005. "Repercusiones electorales del Consenso de Washington," Research Department Publications 4406, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.

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